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INANCIAL TRANSACTIONS such as the buy-
ing and selling of securities, commodities, foreign
exchange and bonds, have increasingly involved
individuals and firms from different countries.
For example, a Japanese resident might purchase
U.S. dollars with Japanese yen (a foreign ex-
change transaction) to buy shares of IBM on the
New York Stock Exchange (a securities transac-
tion). To accommodate such transactions, futures
and securities exchanges have expanded the
services they offer their users, adding numerous
financial instruments, engaging in cooperative
efforts across exchanges and introducing com-
puter-based technologies.
The globalization of world markets provides
significant benefits, including greater opportuni-
ties for investors to diversify risk, and access to
broader markets for demanders of funds. Inter-
national trading in financial instruments, how-
ever, does pose risks, some of which can be
mitigated by coordination between global finan-
cial markets.
This paper describes recent institutional de-
velopments in the globalization of financial mar-
kets and discusses the advantages and disadvan-
tages of these innovations. The paper opens
with a brief overview of the various transna-
tional developments that are occurring in world
securities and commodities markets. It then ad-
dresses both the benefits of expanding financial
markets and the costs that accompany the move.
Risk factors and standardization of procedures
are highlighted as issues of concern as financial
centers globalize. The paper closes with a dis-
cussion of the Group of Thirty proposal for the
coordination of clearing and settlement in world
securities markets.
The trend toward internationalization of finan-
cial markets can be illustrated by highlighting
the rapid increases in transactions in a few
markets. For example, cross-country activity,
when measured as the volume of foreign trans-
actions in securities of U.S. firms (aggregate
purchases and sales), grew from $75.3 billion in
1980 to $361.4 billion in 1990.’ Similarly, U.S.
transactions in securities of foreign firms (aggre-
gate purchases and sales) grew from $17.85 bil-
hon to $253.4 billion between 1980 and 1990.2 In
futures and options markets, 20 new exchanges
lAbken (1991), p. 3. 2lbid18
were established worldwide between 1985 and
1989, bringing the total to 72.~Likewise, nearly
40 million futures and options contracts were
traded worldwide in 1988, an increase of ap-
proximately 186 percent since 1983.~Eurodollar
interest rate futures saw an especially large
change, increasing almost 70 percent annually
between 1983 and 1988.~
.Iih.wfrations of Gkibaliz:ation
The globalization of financial and commodity
markets involves numerous activities and institu-
tional developments that facilitate access to for-
eign markets, whether by a trader or a security.
One of these activities is the cross-listing of
securities in several countries. Cross-listing sim-
ply means, for example, that a firm in the United
States lists its stocks on a London exchange. In
1990, the International Stock Exchange (ISE) of
London had one of the highest percentages (23
percent) of foreign company stock listings.8
Another trend is cross-country hedging and
portfolio diversification. A U.S. trader, for exam-
ple, can diversify a portfolio composed of U.S.
stocks by buying stocks of a U.K. firm in Lon-
don through a London broker. Globalization can
also mean holding membership in another coun-
try’s exchanges. For example, after “The Big
Bang” of 1986 in London, many US. securities
firms and banks apphed to buy seats on London
exchanges!
A third trend in the internationalization of
financial markets is called “passing the book,”
whereby control of trading is passed between
traders at exchanges around the globe. This
enables 24-hour trading of a financial instrument.
An example of this would be a U.S. investment
firm trading from New York during U.S. and
Japanese hours and from its London desk during
U.K. hours. The more common practice of pass-
ing the position book between time zones is ac-
tually to transfer the handling instructions be-
tween traders. An example is a New York
currency trader who instructs the trader at his
Singapore office to track the price of a currency
during evening hours in New York. When the
market reaches a particular price, the Singapore
trader will buy or sell, depending on instructions
from New York.
One trend that does not involve actual trading
is the underwriting of corporate securities
through offices outside the home country. An
underwriter is a firm that buys an issue of
securities from a company, then resells it to in-
vestors. For the company issuing the securities,
underwriting provides a guarantee that a certain
amount of money will be derived from the sale
of the securities that can be used for capital ex-
penditure. A large stock issue may have under-
n’riters from several countries, for example, to
compensate for a country whose capital market
does not have the depth to handle large securi-
ties offerings.8 The distribution of underwriters
across several countries provides the issuing
firm with a wider access to funding.°Investors,
on the other hand, obtain a broader selection of
securities.
.EJan/’siopnIenta in intonaa ted Trad-
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More recently, the development of automated
trading has received substantial attention. Auto-
mated or electronic trading systems allow agents
to make trades via computer, without the “open
outcry” or pit auction system.’°Interestingly,
the development of much of the current auto-
mation is an extension of technological innova-
tions originally developed for domestic markets.
It is clear, however, that this automation has af-
3Baer, Evanoff and Pavel (1991), p. 11.
4lbid.
5Eurodollar deposits are dollar-denominated deposits out-
side the United States. Eurodollar interest rate futures con-
tracts are futures contracts on the interest rates on these
deposits. The figures are from Baer, Evanoff and Pavel
(1991), p. 11.
6For the New York Stock Exchange, the figure was 3.7 per-
cent. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment
(1990), p. 29.
7The Big Bang was a deregulation effort for British financial
markets which began on October 27, 1956. Examples of
changes to the London equity markets are the end of fixed
commission rates; barriers between order-taking brokers
established. The SIB is a non-governmental version of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United
States. Khoury (1990), p. 129.
8Depth means that there are enough buyers and sellers in
a market that a large transaction will not affect the price.
9An example is the privatization of French companies in
1986, where the value of these newly privatized companies
was approximately $30 billion, but the total value of list-
ings on the Paris Bourse was only about $50 billion. U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1990), p. 34.
‘°Openoutcry occurs on an organized exchange when ord-
ers between buyers and sellers are traded between third
parties in anonymity. The buyer/seller enters into a con-
tract with the exchange or its representative
clearinghouse. and risk-taking market makers were broken down; and, the
self-regulating Securities and Investment Board (SIB) wasfected the globalization of financial markets con-
siderably.
The National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations (Nasdaq) was one of the
earliest developments in financial market com-
puterization, beginning in 1971. Nasdaq pro-
vides computer listings of price information for
several thousand companies. By 1982, the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
had produced the National Market System, which
provided investors with information as sales
were completed, and by 1991, had developed
the Private Offerings, Resales, and Trading
through Automated Linkages (PORTAL) system.”
From a computer terminal, PORTAL enables
users to trade in unregistered domestic and for-
eign debt and equity securities.”
Nasdaq has established computer telephone
linkage as well as automated trade execution
and international clearing and settlement with
the International Stock Exchange of London and
the Stock Exchange of Singapore. Nasdaq has
since become a significant market for the listing
of foreign securities, trading approximately $6
billion in foreign securities as of 1991, up from
the $2.6 billion in 1985.’~Thus, Nasdaq provides
the cross-listing of securities, together with the
rapid trade execution of an automated system.
The growth of international trading has also
affected futures and options exchanges in the
United States. The fact that traders could access
instruments and overseas markets after normal
U.S. trading hours had ended, provided a motiva-
tion for many of the extended-hour and 24-hour
trading initiatives (see shaded insert for examples
of extended trading hours and table 1 for auto-
mated trading systems).
A significant portion of U.S. financial instru-
ments, futures and options is traded at exchanges
throughout the world. That is, foreigners do not
have to use the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to
trade Eurodollar contracts, a CME staple. For
example, in 1989, a third of the trade in con-
tracts offered by the CME originated outside of
North America.’~In 1989, 10 percent of the
CME’s daily volume was transacted overnight in
an overseas exchange while the CME was
closed.” Furthermore, in 1985, the CME and
Chicago Board of Trade together accounted for
83 percent of all futures volume. By 1990, the
figure had fallen to 55 percent.’6 The attempt to
regain market share instigated such CME expan-
sions as extended trading hours and automated
trading systems.
Perhaps the most ambitious project in auto-
mated trading is Globex, an attempt to create a
24-hour trading market originally proposed in
1987 by the CME.’7 Globex is an electronic trade
execution system whereby traders enter buy
and sell orders that are matched automatically
according to price and time priority.’~Originat-
ing as a strictly off-hours trading system, the
purpose of Globex is to enable continued active
trading beyond the CME’s regular trading
hours. The CME intends to use Globex to access
markets after its own close of business and re-
gain some of the market share lost to foreign
exchanges.
.Po1.Itrv’I’I.A.L (i~ i.i.NS .A.IN.D .n.us..x.s (I).i~
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The significant changes accompanying the in-
ternationalization of financial trading systems al-
low for the realization of substantial gains; at
the same time, globalization also exacerbates the
risks already present in financial trading. The
most significant of these gains and risks are
described below.
.b~nejit~s ni t.notaaiaza.n.on
One of the most important areas of progress
is the speed with which information is processed
and disseminated to market participants. In-
creased flow of market data provides greater
“PORTAL uses a book entry settlement system with no
physical delivery, eliminating the problem of unmatched
trades. PORTAL is currently the only fully automated clear-
ing and settlement system in the United States. Clearing
and settlement issues, book entry and matching trades will
be discussed in more detail later in the text.
‘2Unregistered securities are not registered with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC). They are issued in
a limited volume or by small companies.
‘35ee Nasdaq (1991), p. 16, for the 1991 figure, and NASD
(1991), p. 15. for the 1985 figure.
l4Hansell (1959), p. 187.
“Ibid.
‘6CheslerMarsh (1991), p. 33.
“The Chicago Board of Trade has since become a par-
ticipant with the CME in the Globex project.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9gy increases the familiarity of foreign corpora-
tions and their operations. This spread of infor-
mation reduces one of the traditional obstacles
to foreign investment and opens up both savings
and investment opportunities for firms and in-
dividuals. The payoff is a more efficient alloca-
tion of capital and, thus, a stimulus to production
and real output.
Likewise, the advent of almost immediate
transfer of information around the globe reduces
the informational discrepancies between market
participants. Arbitrageurs, of course, attempt to
profit from price discrepancies. The more people
have access to the same information, however,
the more likely price discrepancies will be spot-
ted and acted upon. The divergence of prices
from their no-arbitrage relationship (which pro-
vides profit potentials), will be quickly arbitraged
away as both the quantity and speed of infor-
mation transfer is enhanced!°
Another benefit of internationalization is ac-
cess to markets otherwise inaccessible. As men-
tioned earlier, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
will be accessible after regular trading hours
through Globex. Not only will U.S. traders now
be able to operate after U.S. trading hours, but
foreign traders can also use Globex to operate
during their own regular trading hours. New
markets enable investors to introduce diversity
into their portfolios in both the type of instru-
ment and the country from which it is issued.
Just as computerized systems, such as Globex,
facilitate diversification and accessibility, so too
can other methods, such as cross-exchange list-
ings and cross-memberships.
Trading in financial assets, whether done
domestically or across national boundaries, in-
volves risk. Some of these risks are more impor-
tant in an international setting than a strictly
domestic setting. They occur primarily at vari-
ous stages of the clearing and settlement
process. Unlike risks commonly associated with
price uncertainty, the risks in clearing and set-
tlement procedures involve uncertainty about
the timely payment of funds and the transfer of
assets in financial trades.
An example of a typical securities transaction
can provide a clear illustration. Once a securities
trade is executed, the member firms involved
submit the trade information for confirmation
to the clearing agent. The trade is then com-
pared and matched by computer for accuracy
and the information on the trade is sent to the
relevant members on either the day of the
trade or the day after. If both parties concur
with the conditions of the trade, the trade is
ready for settlement. At present, settlement in
securities occurs five days after the trade in the
United States.
Using this example, the next section will briefly
discuss the concepts and institutions in clearing
and settlement procedures before introducing
the specific risks of globalization.
...__,J ~‘~,C~)C_,_.__
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“Clearing” a trade involves the confirmation of
the type and quantity of the financial instru-
ment being traded, the transaction date and
price, and the identification of the buyer and
seller. “Settlement” means the fulfillment of the
obligations of the transaction. In equities and
bonds, for example, settlement means payment
to the seller and delivery of the security certifi-
cate or transfer of ownership to the buyer.
The clearing and settlement process depends
on the institutions that facilitate transactions.
Commodities and securities exchanges provide
the facilities for traders to conduct their busi-
ness, establish and enforce trading rules, collect
and distribute market and economic information
about prices, and provide an institutional frame-
work for arbitrating and settling disputes.
Another institution—the clearinghouse—
compares trades between parties and can re-
move risk from the settlement process.2’ A
clearinghouse places itself between the buyer
and seller, ensuring that the buyer receives the
instrument purchased and the seller receives
payment. That is, by becoming the counterparty
to all trades, the clearinghouse guarantees every
trade. Each participant has a net obligation with
the clearinghouse to buy or sell the security
t0An example of a no-arbitrage condition is that the differ-
ence between the cash and futures price of a storable
commodity, at any point in time, should reflect carrying
costs of storing the commodity until maturity. If the price
differential exceeds carrying costs, then there exists an in-
centive to enter the market, that is, to buy today and sell
at the higher futures price.
21Trade comparison involves confirming and matching the
terms of the trade to ensure accuracy.Table 1
Automated Trading Systems
Systemt ____~R9nsor Purpose Instruments
Access New York Mercantite Computerized screen traoing Energy futures and futures-
Exchange (NYMEX) system to automatically match options for crude oil. heat-ng
trade on a first-in-first-out oil, gasoline, propane arid
basis. Allows traders lo natural gas
select a standtng bid or offer
(but are blind to the
counterparty chosen).
Automated Pu Trading London International Intenoed to extend tradung FT-SE 100 index futures and
CAPT) Financial Futures hours to cover European most of LIFFE’s main
Excnange (LIFFE) trading day Its aim is to contracts
copy the life o’ the trading
floor on to a computer screen
EJV (Electronic Joint Gollaooration between Trading system that allows Currently restricted to
Venture) F:rst Boston. Goldman dealers to buy and sell Treasury bills and notes with
Sachs. Morgan Stanley. securIties electronically maturity of less than three
Salomon Brotners. using voice-activated computer years Once established, it
Shearson Lehman and tecnnology. Also provides expects to extend cove’age
Citbank price and analytic services to all maturit.es
Euroquote European Community (E~ A European-wsde share trading EC stocks
national stock exonanges system Wit combine prcoinfor-
mation from 12 EC exchanges
into an electronic feed f
0
r sub-
scribers Eventually. may oe-
come a full trading system and
integrate Euroquote wth a set-
tlement system to decrease the
cost and difficulties of settling
cross-country transactions. (This
proposal has since been aban-
doned by the chairmen of Eu-
ropes national stock
exchanges)
Globex Chicago Mercantile An automated t’ading system Traded instruments will be
Exchange (CME). Reuters w:tt, anonymous buy and sell :ntroduced in three separate
and Chicago Board of orders that are matched Dy waves 1) financial futures
Trade ~CBOT) price and t-me (See text and options e.g - Eurodoltar
for detailsi futures, futures and options
on Eurodollar currencies_
Deutschemark. yen pound
sterling. Canadian and A’us-
t’alan dollars Swiss franc
LIBOR. and US Treasury
bond aid note futures aid
options. 2) equity-related




Systemt ..J!°~L. Purpose — _~jnst~p~ftts —
Quotron System Inc Current testing of the Joint protect to develop a Trades •n foreign excnange
prototype nvolves Tne computer system tiat
Bank ot America. Barclays automatically matches ano
Barnc. Chase Manhattan executes ioreign exchar-ge
Bank. Cnemical Bank. traoes.
Citibank. ~red’t Suisse.
Lloyds Banic. Midland Bank.
Morgan Guaranty National
Westminster. Swiss Bank
corp. and Union Bank of
Swrtzertand.
Swss Options and Owned by Switzerlands Fully automated trading and Futures and options on the 13
E~nancialFutures three leading stock clearung system. where undertytng stocks and the
Exchange ~SOFFEX~ excnanges and tve quotes and orcers are Swiss Market Index tSMll a
largest banks recorded sorted and basket of Swtzerlands 24
matcned automatically leading stocks
The computer screen is com-
posed of five segments. each
w.th oifterent types ot unforma-
ton and automatically updateo
throughout the oay.
tOf these systems. only LiFFE’s APT system ano SOFFEX are currently .n operation
NOTE For a more extensive survey ot automated systems. see Peter A. Abken Glooatizat.on of Stock Futures. and
Options Markets. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review ~July/August 1~91l
based on her net position with other participants
in the clearinghouse.
A third institution—the depository—is an or-
ganization (not necessarily part of an exchange)
that holds stocks and bonds for safekeeping on
behalf of their owners. It has a computerized
accounting system to record and transfer owner-
ship of securities between participants by in-
tegrating a book-entry system with a money
transfer system.22
The procedures for clearing and settlement
vary across countries. At present, there are
three common methods of clearing and settle-
ment. Each involves various combinations of the
three central institutions involved in futures and
securities markets.
The first model is exemplified by the United
Kingdom’s equities market. In this model, there
is neither a central depository nor a separate
clearinghouse. Instead, the stock exchange itself
is responsible for trade matching and confirma-
tion as well as providing a location for the deliv-
ery and receipt of securities and payments be-
tween traders.~~
The second model, exemplified by Germany’s
Deutscher Kassenverein depository system, has
no independent clearinghouse, but does have a
centralized depository and a stock exchange that
provides the matching and confirmation of
transactions. Once matched and confirmed, the
trade information is sent to the depository for
settlement.~~
22A book-entry system means a credit or debit to a cus-
tomer’s account will transfer securities between buyer and
seller. A money transfer system transfers the funds be-
tween the parties to the trade, such as a wire transfer
23U.S. Congress, Office ofTechnology Assessment (1990),
p. 5B.
24lbid
CA CCC CA AVC~~CC,QC’,A flViAAC~The third model, as seen in the U.S. equities
market, contains all three institutions: a stock
market, a central depository and an indepen-
dent clearinghouse. For example, the National
Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC), which
processes 95 percent of all equities trades in the
United States, is jointly owned by the New York
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange,
and NASD.25 The majority of the securities for
NSCC members, in turn, are held by the Deposi-
tory Trust Company. The stock market and clear-
inghouse together match and confirm transac-
tions. The clearinghouse also places itself be-
tween counterparties to trades, then passes
trade information to the depository.28
•I~Iisk,s’ in (..Je.aring ain.! Settiernent
Credit (or counterparty) risk occurs when one
side of the transaction does not settle in full,
either when due or on a later date. The exis-
tence of counterparty risk, which is of minimal
significance in many U.S. markets because of a
clearinghouse, can be critical in an international
transaction. The clearinghouse, generally well
capitalized, guarantees that all trades will be hon-
nored. In many international transactions, how-
ever, no clearinghouse exists. Thus, a trader
lacks information about the counterparty’s relia-
bility. Varying regulations on foreign trading
may make it even more difficult to ascertain the
safeguards available to a trader in that market.
Closely related to credit risk is liquidity risk,
which is the risk that trades will not be settled
at the appointed time, but at some undetermined
time thereafter.27 At settlement, counterparties
are exposed to both credit and liquidity risks.
Liquidity risk occurs because settlement may
not occur on the specified date; credit risk occurs
because the other party may not deliver at all.
Thus, at settlement, the parties may not know
whether the problem will be one of liquidity or
credit. The settlement of international trades
can exacerbate the problem of simultaneously
exchanging securities for payment because of
time zone differences.28
Another risk, replacement cost risk, occurs
when the price of the security changes between
trade and settlement. When one party has de-
faulted and the price of the instrument changes,
then one of the parties involved would be ad-
versely affected by the price change and suffer’
a loss in replacing the transaction. In foreign
markets, the potential for adverse changes in
the exchange rate can exacerbate this risk.
Operational risk occurs because of the possible
failure of computer systems, telecommunications
or institutionalized procedures during trading.
Given the heavy reliance on technology in ac-
cessing financial markets abroad, this issue is ex-
tremely important in determining the success or
failure of new trading systems. The precautions
taken by the CME for its Globex system—an im-
portant part of its initial proposal to the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission, a govern-
ment regulator of futures exchanges—are a good
example of this.29
Yet another risk, especially worrisome to regu-
lators, is systemic risk. Systemic risk occurs
when credit risks stemming from operational or
financial problems result in agents exiting the
market, which, in turn, threatens the industry.
The inability of one financial institution to make
its payments can cause other participants to be
unable to meet their financial obligations in a
timely manner. In the banking sector, this is
typified as a run from deposits to currency. In
futures and options, it occurs when agents no
longer trade through standard channels like an
exchange. For example, if members of an ex-
change begin trading elsewhere, the financial
stability of the exchange is threatened as mem-
bers withdraw their financial collateral.’°
25U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1990),
p. 81.
tmmFor related readings on clearance and settlement systems,
see the monographs prepared by the Payment System
Studies Staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in
the references to this paper.
27A temporary inability to convert assets into cash is often
associated with liquidity risk while bankruptcy of a counter-
party is associated with credit risk. For a more detailed
description, see Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(February 1989).
29Examples of CME precautions include measures to pre-
vent unauthorized individuals from accessing the system,
such as four different identification codes; termination of a
computer operator’s session if nonstandard instructions
are entered; and, in the failure of the central computer,
recovery would involve automatic switchover to a back-up
mainframe, taking approximately 60-90 seconds. See
CFTC (1989), pp. 125-32.
3mFor further reading on systemic risks, see OECD (1991).
2mFor further reading on market risks, see Baer and Evanoff
(1990).i~i1C:C.,C~C it)t•IiftCliI•S:•iiC:c.•it•itS
The October 1987 stock market crash, with
worldwide repercussions, revealed weaknesses
in the clearing and settlement system. Many
feared that the default of a major market player
could threaten the financial systems of many
countries. This prompted world financial lead-
ers to work toward global coordination. The
clearing and settlement of trades was consi-
dered one of the most crucial aspects of this
coordination.
In 1989, the Group of Thirty issued a report,
Clearing and Settlement Systems in the World’s
Securities Markets.31 Based on its examination,
five critical deficiencies in the clearing and set-
tlement systems across countries were iden-
tified:
[1] Absence of compatible trade confirmation
and matching systems for both domestic and
international trades;
[2] Varying settlement periods across the differ-
ent markets;
[31 Absence of delivery versus payment in some
markets;
[4] Absence of standardized trade guarantees;
[5] Absence of book entry processing for settle-
ment of securities transactions in several
markets.
~ t.:nnjnwnannr nnd .litriliij.g
Trade confirmation and matching, also known
as trade comparison, is the process of confirm-
ing and matching the terms of a trade to ensure
accuracy (for example, the issue, price, quantity
and counterparties) and is usually done by a
clearinghouse (although sometimes by an ex-
change or by the parties themselves, in the for-
ward foreign exchange market). If not confirmed
and matched, a chain reaction of failed trades is
possible as subsequent trades are made on the
assumption that earlier trades will be success-
fully completed.
Rapid trade comparison shortens the amount
of time between when the trade is made and
when it is successfully matched. This reduces
credit risk by reducing the amount of time an
agent has to opt for defaulting on a trade. In
the international context, delays of hours in a
domestic market may result in a delay of days
for international trades. Requiring all investors
to obtain membership in a trade comparison
system and achieving a compatible system across
international markets can reduce the delays and
credit risks involved in diverse systems.
The second deficiency is unequal settlement
periods, which can increase settlement risk and
potential default. Settlement t1sk occurs when
there are gaps in the timing of payments and
receipts on settlement date.32 The harm of dif-
ferent settlement periods is that, as mentioned
earlier, traders or investors who are active par-
ticipants in the market make later trades contin-
gent on the assumption of the successful settle-
ment of earlier trades. Hence, the harm is two-
fold—the default of an earlier counterparty and
the dependence on this trade that could
jeopardize subsequent trades. As with many
trade issues that require timeliness, delays in
settlement can be exacerbated if spread across
different trading hours and time zones.
While this is costly in a domestic market, the
investment of a U.S. agent dealing in interna-
tional markets can be even more costly because
it is also subject to the economic conditions of
foreign countries and exchange rates. Adverse
changes in the exchange rate can turn a minor
loss into a significant one in the presence of
currency risk. i’hus, for agents moving between
international markets, an uncertain settlement
period combined with an uncertain exchange
rate can increase financial losses.
The growing volume of trades has led to a
number of techniques where, to reduce the
number of settlement transactions, trades are
not processed one at a time. ‘Netting” is a sys-
tem whereby transactions are aggregated, so
that debit and credit positions offset each other,
leaving a participant with one final position in
the market of owing or being owed. Netting
greatly increases the liquidity of the market and
the trader’s flexibility because, rather than post-
ing collateral for every trade, the trader is
responsible only for the net settlement dehit.~’
31The Group of Thirty is a private sector organization that
takes its membership from financial sectors such as ex-
changes, banks and investment houses.
32Setttement risk encompasses both liquidity risk and credit
risk.
33Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1990), p. 40.
‘C CCC CA ~_r~~’ C-C26
There are three main choices for a netting
system- The first is bilateral netting, whereby
all trades in the same security and between the
same parties to the trade are netted to one final
delivery versus payment (DVP).34 For example, if
Ralph sells 100 shares of British Mohair to Sam,
then buys back 75 shares of British Mohair from
Sam, the net position is that Ralph must deliver
25 shares to Sam. This is the narrowest of the
three netting options.
The second is multilateral netting (or daily
netting), which, unlike bilateral netting, allows
for different counterparties in the netting
scheme. In this instance, all trades in the same
security are netted to a final debit or credit po-
sition for each participant.
The last option is continuous net settlement,
whereby all trades in a particular security are
pooled by issue to a final debit or credit posi-
tion for the day and any unsettled trades are
carried over and offset against the next day’s
trades. In practice, the clearing corporation sub-
stitutes as the counterparty to the trade in con-
tinuous net settlement.
The type of netting system implemented de-
pends on the volume of the market. Establishing
a multilateral or continuous net settlement sys-
tem is a costly procedure, requiring a risk-
sharing arrangement among members, a clear-
ing corporation (as with continuous net settle-
ment) and powerful computer systems to handle
the volume of trades. The costs of such a sys-
tem may exceed the costs of operating with
only a bilateral system. This is especially true in
low-volume markets where bilateral netting can
be a feasible and less costly alternative. A pro-
posal for a multilateral netting system in the
high-volume foreign exchange market was exa-
mined in 1988 by members of FXNET, a bilater-
al netting system.35 Representatives of leading
international banks, responding to FXNET’s ques-
tionnaire, felt that a major benefit would be to
reduce processing costs.36
This is especially relevant in markets expand-
ing their foreign membership. If netting is desir-
able because it reduces the number of trades to
~~DVP is a payment system whereby the debits and credits
of a trade are applied to the parties’ accounts simul-
taneously.
35For further reading on the netting of foreign exchange
transactions, see Gilbert (1992).
36Minutes of FXNET Multilateral Netting Steering Committee,
(1989).
process, it becomes even more so as markets
service no longer just domestic, but a growing
number of foreign clients. In the FXNET ques-
tionnaire, respondents stated that, “Cross-border
aspects of multilateral netting should be consi-
dered early in the process, as they will be more
important than with bilateral netting.”37 With
the addition of cross-border traders increasing
the transactions volume a market handles, a
netting system would simplify the re-
peated payments that would be introduced.
Whichever netting system is chosen, the desir-
able settlement time frame is a rolling settle-
ment system. In such a system, trades settle on
all business days of the week, scheduled the
same number of days after the trade.3°Thus,
the presence of a standardized settlement period
and a netting system is a crucial aspect to mov-
ing between international markets with security
of settlement.
CC/i,, .t’nnnent
The third finding by the Group of Thirty is
the absence of delivery versus payment (DVP) in
some markets. DVP is a two-sided payment sys-
tem that simultaneously debits or credits the
cash account of one member and makes the
corresponding entry on the securities side of
the transaction. This reduces the settlement risk
that occurs when there is a discrepancy be-
tween the timing of payments and receipts on
settlement date.
The Group of Thirty, arguing the need for
prompt two-sided payments, has recommended
interim procedures: risk can be reduced by de-
livering securities only against a certified check
or by employing a mechanism whereby delivery
and payment are done simultaneously although
through different systems. In either case, net
settlement of cash and securities is completed
by the end of the day.
Even without a formalized DVP, methods can
be developed to minimize settlement risk by
having both parties to a trade settle their ac-
counts simultaneously. With markets indifferent
time zones and, thus, different operating hours,
allowing each side of a trade to settle at a differ-
“Ibid.
~°TheGroup of Thirty recommends the implementation of a
rolling settling system by 1992 so that final settlement oc-
curs three days after the trade.
tr~C’CAACAC ~CCAC,C: cCACCCC’ ,.flrC’~C~ C CCCent time could result in a next-day payment, not
one within the hours of the first settlement.
The fourth deficiency is the absence of stan-
dardized trade guarantees. A trade guarantee
ensures that all compared or netted trades will
be settled, based on the conditions on which
they were compared, even in the event of coun-
terparty default. To assure trade guarantees,
each member of the comparison and netting
systems assumes the default risk of the system.
A standard method of providing a guarantee
is to establish a general clearing fund based on
member contributions. When a default occurs,
the losses are first extracted from the defaulting
party’s clearing fund contribution. If that contri-
bution does not meet the full amount of the loss,
the remainder is charged against the clearing
corporation’s general clearing fund.
The international environment adds an extra
facet to these guarantees. Since membership is
becoming increasingly international, a major
financial loss can strain the capacity of the cor-
poration to handle the failure immediately. Ob-
taining permission for access to additional
funding, for example, could cause unnecessary
delays. Thus, the maintenance of additional
sources of funds, like member deposits or ac-
cess to bank lines, becomes crucial in an inter-
national setting. To ensure the integrity of the
corporation and, thus, the market, trade guaran-
tees provide a measure of security and stability
in the face of potential failures.
The last issue to be addressed in global coor-
dination is the absence of book entry processing
for settling securities transactions in several
markets. Before addressing book entry, howeyer,
other institutions surrounding this process
should be introduced.
The first of these is a central securities
depository (CSD).~~ The primary activity of a
CSD is to immobilize and dematerialize securi-
ties so that they can be processed in the more
efficient book entry method. Immobilization of
39The strict definition of a CSD requires that a country
should have only one depository. In practice, however,
more than one may exist. This type of system can be ef-
fective as long as there is linkage between the entities to
coordinate trade information. The United States has sever-
al depositories.
securities means that the physical documents
(for example, share certificates) are stored at
the depository, eliminating their actual move-
ment when ownership changes. Dematerializa-
tion means that no physical securities with title
of ownership are issued. Securities exist solely
as computer records.
Transfers of certificates are done by book en-
try, where a simple credit and a balancing debit
to customers’ computerized accounts on the
books of the CSD will transfer securities from
one account to another. Immobilization and de-
materialization replace the more risky and time-
consuming process of transferring the securities
in paper form whenever a transaction is made.
Transfers of stocks trade-by-trade introduce a
needless complication to the clearing and settle-
ment system, which becomes even more compli-
cated if it involves delivering them to investors
worldwide.
The Group of Thirty has proposed nine
recommendations found in table 2 to correct
the preceding five deficiencies. The status of the
Group of Thirty recommendations are listed in
table 3. This table depicts the extent to which
21 countries have made progress on these
recommendations. While the United States has
accomplished more than most of the countries
surveyed, the fact that so many countries have
not finalized these policies, and may not by
1992, has implications for the eventual timetable
of global coordination.~°
Currently, there is no well-defined regulatory
structure for the global marketplace. While
regulatory authorities exist in specific countries—
for example, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has the regulatory authority, oversight
and arbitration of securities disputes in the U.S.
stock market—the international arena has no
similar agency to govern global financial rela-
tions. In its absence, voluntary coordination of
clearing and settlement systems can help reduce
the risks that lead to defaults, failures and po-
tential disputes between legal and regulatory
authorities. Thus, there are potential gains if
4eIn addition to the Group of Thirty proposal, other groups,
such as the Working Group on Financial Markets have
studied clearing and settlement issues.Table 2
Group of Thirty Recommendations
The fol~ovwngare nine recommendations put forth by the Group ofTh’rly to correct tne deficiencies
it tunas in the coordination of clearing and settlement syslemslne numbers in brackets a’e tne rele-
vant defcuencues presented in the sectuo-i. Global ~oordunatuon. that these recommendations address
• By 1990. all comparisons of traoes between aired market particupants Ce.. brokers, brok-
er/dealers and other exchange members) should be accompI~shedby T. 1 (the first day &ter
the trade). [1]
• Indirect market partucupants (such as ,nstututionai investors or any tradng counterparlues tnat
are not broker/dealersl shoulo. by 1992 be members of a trade comparuson system that
achuoves positive affirmation of trade deta’ls. 11]
• Each country should nave an effect,ve and fully oevelopod central securities deposutory. or-
ganuzod and managed to encourage the broadest possuble undusvy particupat!on tdu’ectly
and indu’-ectly) o~1992. [3 5~
• Each country shoulo study uts marKet volume and partuc’patuon to determune whethe~ a trade
nettung system would be benefucual •n (arms of ‘educng risk and promot;ng effucuency If a
nettung system would be appropruate. it should be umplementeo by 1992. ;2~
• Deluvery versus payment (DVP) should be employed as tne method for settlung all securt’es
transactuons. A DVP system should be un place by 1992 ~3 5]
• Payments assocuated wuth the settlement of secur t.es transactuons and the servucng of
securutues porlfolios should be made consustent across all unstruments and mar..ets by adopt-
ing the same day funds conventuon. [21
• A Rolling Settlement” system should be aoopted by all markets. Final settlement shoulo oc-
cur on T+3 by 1992 As an ruer:m target. funal settlement should occu’ on TkS by 1990 at
the latest, save only where ut hunders the achuevement of Ti 3 by 1992 ~2]
• Securt:es lendung and borrowuna should oe encourageo as a method of expedutnq the set-
tlement of secur.t.es transaciuons. Exustunq regulatory and taxaton barruers that ,nhubrt the
pract.ce of lendung securtues should be removed by 19902 [~1
• Eacn country should adopt the standaro for securufles mossages developed by the Interna-
tuona Orgar’uzatuon for Standardizat,on [ISO Stanoard 7775] In part;cula~countrues should
adopt the SIN numnerung system for securutues ssues as derned in the ISO Standard 6166.
at east for coss-DorOer transactions Tnese standards should be universally appIueo by
1992.
‘Group of Thirty tMa-cr 1989).
For info’mation on securutuos ler.dng. see Paul C Lipson. Bradley K. Sabel. arid Frank Keane. Secu-
rities Lending (Fede-al Rosarve Bank of New York. August 1989)
tlit (liLttitlt2 LIM(I -,t’ttli’rtuu-rui .,\~tirtN iipt’r~iliI1t2 iii lnli-rri,ititurr;ui i’timrIi’tiliiuri tirititig tiriauuiiil
cii,ruui’,,lu- rl1Ltrl~t’t.,arc iiuir’iiu!l;ited .trtrcu!lg global market, i’~!mining rapiull\ and ha,~in-~diui’il
liritriti,il rui,ir’kt’t-, hi-ru-lit. ‘~urhas urn titraririal ii-.triiriluriK lien
rirLirkets ,ititl t’\ltiiiliii ti’adiii~houir’. I lti—’,e
i’ilititiZt’7. liiit~ i’\ Vt ate unit nit hunt ru,.ts. I )ninr,—
tic rule—. arid n-gttlatiuri LilY riot .iitlirteril
~al’rguartk tin a ..\sIlirr lli,tl rrj)i’r’.ilt’. iii itt iii
I HR tlisrtis~iouiha’ attempted tu prr-~c’uttart rr’ea~nigl~ iiitvrriali trial i-un rr’onriiint.
in tn len ol i~~ite~ that art’ u-u_i rrenIl~tit intere “I and iii~ci rrrrrrntal rurnrmirutii’~ ar-i’ acldi-essiuig
ri the ~Iuhalciatiuut nt hiram-jul market.. I lit- hr rwrtl to iriregr.ite nti’r-nati,utal e\liati~iiili to
h’rkzigt— among iiittrtiattnriai mar ket~I~ it in— rarjhtate the ronti iui’cl sate and
teri-,l both Iii pu-Rate inn t—,tnr’ ,utul tn riLitiiiuill gi’tinth il tirizilithil in,,tflnllvtit5 ,uid thu
i4tnernlnii-uit.—, n liii ch’’,irv stalilt duune’.tjc ,nntl tant tluntrti lit. llti”~emarkets -.enc II is iliar
intir’rlttinriLil tiuanciiil surtili’-,. that trim-h \\ ni’k rerllani~.Table 3
Current Status of the Group of Thirty’s Recommendations for International
Settlement—Equities
RecommendationNe I 2 3456789
Institutional Central Delivery Rolling
Comparison Comparison Seountles Securities versus Settlement Same-Day Securities
Country on Ti-P System Depository Netting Payment en T-i-5
2
Funds 1SOIISM Lending
Austratma Yes No No No Yes Open No No Yes
Austria Yes No Yes No No Weekly Yes No No
Betgium No No Yes No Yes Fortntghtty Yes No Yes
Canada Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes T-i-5 Yes No Yes
Denmark Yes No No No Yes T÷3 Yes No Yes
Fintand Yes No No No Yes 1÷5 No No No
F ance Yes No Yes No No Monthhy Yes No Yes
Germany Yes No Yes No Yes T-i-2 Yes No No
Hong Kong Yes No No No Yes T+1 No No Limited
ttaty Yes No Yes No Yes Monthly Yes No Limited
J pan Yes No No Yes Yes 1÷3 No No Yes
Korea No No Yes No Yes T-i-2 NQ No No
Nethertands Yes No Yes Yes Yes T5 No No Yes
Norway Yes No No No Yes 1+6 Yes No No
Stngapore Yes No No No Yes 1-i-S No No Yes
Spain Yes No No No No Weekly No No L’mtted
Sweden Yes No Yes No Yes I S No No Yes
Swutzertand Yes No Yes No Yes T÷3 Yes No Yes
Thailand Yes No Yes Yes Yes 1±4 Yes No No
United Kingdom Yes Yes No Yes No Fortnightty No No Limited
United States Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes I S No No Yes
SOURCE Updated by the Office of Technology Assessment, July 1990 from A Comparative View The Group of Thirty’s
Recommendations and the Current US National Clearance and Settlement System (Morgan Stanley &C o June 1989).
11÷1means the first day after the trade
21÷5 means five days after the trade
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